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Criminal Procedure
By RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has had an especially ac-
tive year in the criminal procedure area. Since the nature of
this article does not permit extended commentary on all of the
Court's decisions, discussion will be limited to the more signifi-
cant cases, which deal with automobile inventory searches,
waiver of constitutional rights, and plea bargaining.'
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, Centre College;
J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard University.
I In addition to the decisions discussed in the text, three other cases deserve
mention. In Deskins v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1974), an indicted defen-
dant made incriminating statements to a friend who had been wired by police with a
microphone and radio transmitter. The defendant was not in custody, nor was his
attorney present during the conversation. The Court held that the conversation, which
was electronically recorded by the police, could be introduced into evidence, since the
procedure did not violate the defendant's right to counsel. It had difficulty, however,
reconciling its holding with Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), in which
the defendant, who had been indicted and released from custody, was engaged in a
conversation with Colson, who had permitted the police to wire the automobile where
the conversation took place. The Supreme Court held:
[T]he petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee [the
right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of
his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited
from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel. Id. at
206.
The Court of Appeals distinguished Massiah on the ground that the defendant, De-
skins, had initiated the contacts with the wired informant "who could in no way be
considered an agent of the Commonwealth." 512 S.W.2d at 526.
In the area of parole revocation procedures, the Court was faced with interpreting
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), in which the Supreme Court had held that a
parolee who is arrested for a parole violation must be given a preliminary hearing "at
or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest. . . to determine
whether there is probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested
parolee has committed acts which could constitute a violation of parole conditions."
Id. at 485. In Davis v. Black, 518 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1975), the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that the defendant's absence from this preliminary hearing would not
violate Morrisey where the defendant parolee was in custody in another state and was
returned directly from that state to the Kentucky reformatory.
In Goins v. Meade, 528 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1975), an indigent defendant was denied
a full transcript of his trial. Specifically, he was denied a free transcript of the voir
dire examination and the opening statements of counsel. Since the defendant's counsel
made no specific claim of error during voir dire or opening statements, the Court of
Appeals held that a transcript omitting those sections did not deprive the defendant
of due process or equal protection. It said, however: "If a defendant or his counsel
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
I. AUTOMOBILE INVENTORY SEARCHES
Warrantless searches of automobiles have been the source
of considerable litigation in the last few years. Several Supreme
Court cases have defined the circumstances in which police
may conduct such searches. One series of cases has established
that police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile
if there is probable cause to search and if the automobile is a
"fleeting target."2 This warrantless intrusion is justified be-
cause if police take the time to obtain a search warrant, the
delay would permit the removal of the vehicle as well as the
removal of any evidence it contains.'
The "inventory search" doctrine is another theory ad-
vanced in recent years to justify warrantless automobile
searches.4 In Cady v. Dombrowski,5 the leading inventory
search case, a Chicago policeman who had an automobile acci-
dent in a small Wisconsin town was arrested for drunken driv-
ing. Because the police believed that Chicago policemen were
required to carry guns at all times, and since no gun had been
found on the defendant's person, the police searched his dis-
abled car, which had been towed to an unguarded lot. The
warrantless search disclosed evidence that incriminated the
defendant. In reviewing his conviction, the Supreme Court
upheld the legality of the search.
claims the occurrence of error during the voir dire, or during opening statements, the
transcript must include those events." Id. at 9.
2 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In the latter two cases, however,
it is questionable whether the vehicles' mobility had created an emergency situation,
that is, a situation in which there was insufficient time to obtain a search warrant. In
Chambers the automobile had been impounded by the police; in Cardwell the arrest
of the defendant occurred only after extended questioning at the police station, during
which time the defendant's car was parked in a public lot near the station.
The Kentucky Court utilized the "fleeting target" theory, citing Chambers, in
Wydman v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1974).
For an example of the emergency doctrine in a nonautomobile case see Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
1 Three Supreme Court cases that could fall under the rubric of "inventory
searches" are: Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). See
Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 357 (1973) for citation to other cases which discuss automobile
searches.
413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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Although Cady probably presents a unique fact pattern
with special dangers that are unlikely to recur, the opinion's
language and interpretation of earlier automobile search cases
seems to indicate that the Supreme Court is willing to permit
the warrantless search of any automobile impounded by the
police. The Court said in Cady:
In Harris the justification for the initial intrusion into
the vehicle was to safeguard the owner's property, and in
Cooper it was to guarantee the safety of the custodians. Here
the justification, while different, was as immediate and con-
stitutionally reasonable as those in Harris and Cooper: con-
cern for the safety of the general public who might be endan-
gered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the
vehicle.'
The expansive impact of this language cannot be fully
appreciated until one realizes that Harris v. United States7 and
Cooper v. California8 did not involve extraordinary circumstan-
ces. Although the Supreme Court thought that the need to
safeguard Harris' property validated an inventory search, there
was no evidence in that case that the automobile was especially
vulnerable to robbery. The Court justified the inventory search
in Cooper on the basis of a need to guarantee the safety of the
car's custodian, despite the absence of evidence of special dan-
ger to the custodian. Thus, Cady seems to approve an inven-
tory search anytime an automobile is legally impounded, for
the necessity of protecting the vehicle's custodian and the ar-
rested person's property will always be at least as intense as it
was in Harris and Cooper.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals may have recently pro-
vided some solace to my liberal brethren who have been ran-
kled by Cady. In Commonwealth v. Dawson9 the defendant had
been arrested for driving while intoxicated. In the course of
inventorying the car's contents prior to towing it to police stor-
age, the arresting officers discovered beer and liquor in the
trunk. In a well-reasoned opinion by Justice Palmore, the
I Id. at 447.
7 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
1 Commonwealth v. Dawson, No. 74-887 (Ky., May 9, 1975).
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Court addressed the question of when an arrested person's auto
may be seized. It indicated that the reasonableness of the
seizure or impoundment of the automobile is an important
element in determining the permissibility of the subsequent
inventory search. The Court also noted: "[T]he practice of
impounding vehicles following arrests for mere traffic viola-
tions is utterly unnecessary and, indeed, is of questionable le-
gality."" ° Relying heavily on an Eighth Circuit opinion," the
Court offered alternatives to impoundment. When the arrested
owner is present and coherent,
it is only reasonable that the owner be allowed to choose
whether or not he wishes his car impounded. In cases where
the owner or operator cannot make his wishes known,
whether because of incapacity or absence (i.e., a parking vio-
lation), in most instances the property would be adequately
safeguarded by rolling up the windows and locking the doors
12
Alternatively, it ordinarily "should be just as easy to reach
some person at his home as it is to call for a wrecker.' ' 3
A number of perceptive and well-reasoned judgments are
evident in Dawson. First, the Court seems to recognize that the
impounding of an automobile is a seizure that must be reason-
able under the fourth amendment. 4 Absent some substantial
justification, it is generally unreasonable for the police to seize
an automobile solely because the driver or owner is arrested."
10 Id. at 8-9.
" United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973).
12 Commonwealth v. Dawson, No. 74-887 at 7 (Ky., May 9, 1975).
13 Id. at 8.
11 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
'1 Several courts have considered the reasonableness of the original seizure to be
relevant to the constitutionality of the subsequent search. United States v. Pannell,
256 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Since the police had no reason to impound the defen-
dant's automobile, there was no lawful basis for an inventory search.); In re One 1965
Econoline, 511 P.2d 168 (Ariz. 1973) (The court held an inventory procedure reasonable
where the officer had lawful possession of the vehicle and would not have been war-
ranted in leaving it in control of its incoherent owner.); People v. Nagel, 95 Cal. Rptr.
129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (The defendant was arrested for running a red light, and his
car was impounded and searched. The court excluded the evidence because the police
could have simply left the car in a legal parking space.); Virgil v. Superior Court, 73
Cal. Rptr. 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (An inventory search was held to be unlawful
because impoundment was unjustified. The defendant had been arrested for reckless
[Vol. 64
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Less intrusive alternatives should be utilized to protect an ar-
restee's automobile when they are available, and a failure to
employ such techniques should make the subsequent inventory
search unreasonable and thus unconstitutional.
This approach is sound. Regardless of one's view concern-
ing the desirability of inventory searches, automobile seizures
are difficult to justify when made without a compelling reason.
This is not to say, however, that the seizure of an arrestee's
automobile will be unreasonable in all circumstances. Cooper, ,6
Harris,'7 and Cady'" are all examples of cases in which the
Supreme Court has found the initial seizure to be reasonable.
In Cooper the impoundment of the automobile was reasonable
because under state law the vehicle was subject to a forfeiture
sale. In Harris the car was evidence in an armed-robbery case.
In Cady the vehicle, which had been in an accident, was a
nuisance along the highway and its comatose driver was unable
to make arrangements to have it towed.
Absent such limited and compelling circumstances, how-
ever, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has indicated that it will
not approve the seizure of an automobile simply because its
owner was arrested. Furthermore, any evidence seized in the
ensuing inventory search will be excluded as fruit of the illegal
seizure.
If. WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
During the past Survey period the Court of Appeals de-
cided three significant cases involving the waiver of one's con-
stitutional rights. In Short v. Commonwealth9 the Court held
that a defendant has the right to waive a jury trial. Prior to this
driving, but there were friends in the car who could have driven it.); People v. Green-
wood, 484 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1971) (The court indicated that if the defendant had been
held overnight because he was misinformed by police as to the amount of bond, then
the impoundment of his automobile was unauthorized and the ensuing inventory was
unlawful.); State v. Singleton, 511 P.2d 1396 (Wash. 1973) (Inventory conducted after
defendant's arrest on a warrant for a minor traffic violation was unlawful since there
was no reasonable cause for impoundment of the legally parked vehicle.).
Is 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
'7 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
" 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
" 519 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975).
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decision a substantial number of Kentucky cases" had inter-
preted § 7 of the Kentucky Constitution as prohibiting a defen-
dant's waiver of his right to a jury in a felony trial.2' Declaring
that "current constitutional safeguards are so comprehensive
that there remains no further necessity for the rule that an
accused may not waive a jury trial,"2" the Court decided that
there "is nothing in the Kentucky Constitution which denies
an accused the right to waive a jury trial. '2 3
In Wake v. Barker4 the Court of Appeals held that a defen-
dant has the right "to proceed to trial without counsel being
in any way associated with him."25 It is noteworthy that 8
months after Wake v. Baker the Supreme Court decided
Faretta v. California,"5 in which it held that a state cannot
constitutionally deny a defendant the right to conduct his own
defense, if, of course, his waiver of counsel is "knowing and
intelligent."2
20 Meyer v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1971) ("The defendant may
not waive jury trial where he enters a plea of not guilty."); Tackett v. Commonwealth,
320 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1959) (The "constitutional right [to a jury trial] cannot be
waived in a felony case."); Allison v. Gray, 296 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Ky. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 914 (1957) (Although "the protection of the right [to trial by juryl
is so secure that one accused of a felony may not waive it," there was no reversable
error if sentencing was by ten jurors.); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W. 983, 984
(Ky. 1927) (The Court reversed a felony conviction by eleven jurors, stating: "[TIhis
court . . . has committed itself to the doctrine . . . that defendant cannot waive his
constitutional right of trial by the ancient mode of trial by jury under felony charges.");
Branham v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W. 489 (Ky. 1925) (The Court refused to permit a
defendant to agree to a trial by seven jurors.).
21 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has traditionally permitted a defendant to
waive his right to a jury trial in a misdemeanor case. See, e.g., Phipps v. Common-
wealth, 266 S.W. 651 (Ky. 1924): "A defendant in a misdemeanor trial in the Circuit
Court is entitled to 12 jurors, but may agree to a lesser number or waive any number
or all of the jurors and submit the law and facts to the Court."
The Court has also upheld the right of a judge to sentence a defendant following
a guilty plea. Lee v. Buchanan, 264 S.W.2d 661 (Ky. 1954). Likewise, sentencing by
less than 12 jurors following a guilty plea is not invalid. Allison v. Gray, 296 S.W.2d
735 (Ky. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 914 (1957).
2 519 S.W.2d at 832.
Id. The right of a defendant in Kentucky to waive a jury trial has been the
subject of two articles. Moreland, Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases in Kentucky,
21 Ky. L.J. 1 (1932); Note, Waiver of Trial Jury in Felony Cases in Kentucky, 48 Ky.
L.J. 457 (1960).
24 514 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1974).
2 Id. at 695.
26 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2 Id. at 835.
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The third waiver case, Britt v. Commonwealth,28 involved
the validity of a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights. Ap-
proximately 2 hours after Britt's arrest for public drunkenness
it became apparent that he had been in a hit-and-run accident.
Although given his Miranda warnings, he nevertheless admit-
ted in subsequent questioning that he had been the driver of
the hit-and-run vehicle. At the time of his admission Britt had
submitted to a breathalizer test, which registered his blood-
alcohol content at .22 per cent.29 Notwithstanding Britt's ap-
parent intoxication at the time he waived his Miranda rights,30
the Court of Appeals held that the confession was admissible.
Prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 31 the admissibility of a confes-
sion was determined by a voluntariness standard. If the totality
of the circumstances indicated that a confession was voluntar-
ily given, the courts permitted it to be introduced into evi-
dence.32 In ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession the
courts looked at factors such as the defendant's emotional inst-
ability3 and youth,34 whether he had been physically abused35
or threatened, 36 and the length of his interrogation. 37 In
Miranda, the Supreme Court declared that a confession is in-
admissible unless the defendant has been warned, inter alia, of
his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present at ques-
tioning.38 It further held that these rights can be waived only if
11 512 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1974).
21 Under the provisions of Ky. REv. STAT. § 189.520(4)(c), in effect at the time of
the Britt case, blood alcohol of .10 percent raised a presumption that the driver was
"under the influence of intoxicating beverages."
The Court described the condition of Britt as follows:
He [the arresting officer] described Britt as having been "very drunk
• . . almost passed out" when arrested, but neither drunk nor sober at the
time of the interview in which he admitted having been the driver of the car.
Another officer described his condition at the latter time as "fairly drunk"
and expressed the opinion that he "just didn't know really where he was at
or what he was doing. He just seemed in a state of coma of some kind."
512 S.W.2d at 498.
31 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
3 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
11 See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
3 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Is See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
'7 See Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
• 384 U.S. at 467-79.
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the waiver is "knowing, intelligent and voluntary.''"
Although the exact limits of this "knowing, intelligent and
voluntary" standard are uncertain, it is quite clear from
Miranda and later cases that it is more protective of the defen-
dant than the voluntariness standard. 0 Specifically, the
Miranda Court stated:
In these cases we might not find the defendants' statements
to have been involuntary in traditional terms. . . .The fact
remains that in none of these cases did the officers undertake
to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interro-
gation to insure that the statements were truly the product
of free choice.4'
Additional evidence that the Supreme Court distinguishes
between "voluntary" and "knowing, intelligent and voluntary"
can be found in the 1973 case, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.'2 In
Schneckloth the Supreme Court held that while "voluntari-
ness" is the criterion for assessing the validity of a consent to
search, in other situations, including the Miranda warnings,
the more rigorous "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" test
applies.43
In the Britt case, however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
used language that could be interpreted as adopting voluntari-
ness as the standard for a valid waiver of Miranda rights.44 At
one point the Court stated: "The heart of the problem is
whether his waiver and ensuing admissions were, from a legal
standpoint, 'voluntary.' ",4 Furthermore, pre-Miranda deci-
sions constituted much of the authority for the decision.46
On the other hand, it is not clear that the Court of Appeals
applied a voluntariness standard. Elsewhere in the decision the
3' Id. at 475-76.
See 26 VAND. L. REv. 1069, 1073 (1973).
" 384 U.S. at 457.
42 421 U.S. 218 (1973).
13 Id. at 241.
11 At least one commentator has opined that the more stringent formalized waiver
demanded by Miranda has not precipitated any additional protection for defendants.
Note, Waiver of Rights in Police Interrogation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 447 (1969).
4 Britt v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Ky. 1974).
4' The Court cited the following: Townsend v. Sain, 373 U.S. 293 (1963); Black-
burn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Peters v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 686
(1966); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 361 (1963).
[Vol. 64
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"basic question" was characterized as "whether the confessor
was in sufficient possession of his faculties to give a reliable
statement . . . . 47 The Court also noted that there was no
evidence that "Britt did not understand what he was doing. '4 8
In addition to the imprecision of the norm applied to the
waiver of Britt's Miranda rights, the case is noteworthy as a
reflection of the Court's attitude toward the Miranda decision.
By holding that Britt made a valid waiver of his rights, the
Court has demonstrated an attitude of grudging deference to
Miranda.
The attitudes and biases of a decision-maker unavoidably
influence the resolution of any legal issue, especially when a
standard is as amorphous as "knowing, intelligent and volun-
tary." Within certain fairly broad limits, a court determining
whether a particular waiver was knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary is virtually free to decide any concrete case however it
wishes.49 What becomes important, therefore, is the court's per-
ception of the value of the protection afforded, as contrasted
with the harm which results from excluding confessions taken
in violation of the Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals has
evinced what appears to be a restrictive attitude toward the
Miranda rights. The Court's approach may be based on a belief
that the warnings are ineffective,5" for which there is some sup-
port in empirical studies." Alternatively, it may be based on
the belief that the Miranda decision goes too far. The Court of
Appeals may have determined that the cost to society of ex-
cluding relevant evidence is greater than any benefit to per-
sonal freedoms attained by strict enforcement of Miranda
rights.
11 512 S.W.2d at 500.
Id.
" The Kentucky Court of Appeals has interpreted Miranda on a number of occa-
sions, generally following a more conservative path in its interpretations. See Shadoan
v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1972); Dennis v. Commonwealth, 464 S.W.2d
253 (Ky. 1971); Cody v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. 1970); Brown v. Com-
monwealth, 445 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1969); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 394 (Ky.
1967).
" See note 45 supra.
See Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of
Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police
Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH.
L. REV. 1347 (1968).
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III. PLEA BARGAINING: JUDGE'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW
PROSECUTOR'S RECOMMENDATION
Plea bargaining52 is a fact of life in criminal law.13 It is also
a source of unfairness, defeated expectations, and playacting. 4
The failure of the sentencing authority to follow the recommen-
dation of the prosecutor was recently treated by the Court of
Appeals in Couch v. Commonwealth." The defendant in Couch
agreed to plead guilty to housebreaking and robbery in ex-
change for an agreement by the Commonwealth's attorney to
recommend two 6-year concurrent sentences. The Common-
wealth's attorney also agreed to recommend that the sentences
run concurrently with an unrelated 2-year sentence, which the
defendant was serving at the time of his trial. The defendant
entered a guilty plea, and the Commonwealth's attorney made
"2 This term is generally used to describe negotiations between the prosecution
and the defense, whereby they attempt to agree, for example, to permit the defendant
to plead guilty to the crime charged or a lesser charge in exchange for the recommenda-
tion of a particular sentence by the prosecution. See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining:
Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
11 For a discussion of the mechanics and scope of plea bargaining in New York and
Philadelphia see White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U.
PA. L. REV. 439, 441-48 (1971).
Plea bargaining has been the subject of much comment, both favorable and unfa-
vorable. Compare Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS 70, 71-73 (1967) and
Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 291-95 (1972) with THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 112-14 (1967) (Appendix A) and NATIONAL ADVISORY COM-
MISSION, THE COURTS, 44-48 (1973) (recommending that plea bargaining be eliminated
by no later than 1978).
Notwithstanding this criticism the Supreme Court has endorsed plea bargaining
as "an essential component of the administration of justice" which if "[properly
administered, it is to be encouraged." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260
(1971). See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) in which the Court stated:
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid
under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire
to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a
wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a
higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.
Id. at 751.
"' There have been a number of recommendations for alteration of existing plea
bargaining procedures. See White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining
Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 453-65 (1971); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain,
82 YALE L.J. 286, 299-303 (1972); NATINAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, THE COURTS 44-48
(1973) (recommending that plea bargaining be eliminated by no later than 1978).
- No. 74-1137 (Ky., June 6, 1975).
[Vol. 64
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his recommendation, but the circuit court failed to adopt all
of the prosecutor's recommendations" and refused to permit
the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Court of Appeals held that the lower court had not
abused its discretion by refusing to permit the withdrawal of
the guilty plea. It indicated, however, that in certain instances
such a refusal would amount to an abuse of discretion. The
Court framed the issue as follows:
The question then becomes whether the refusal of the court
to be bound by the agreement and recommendation of the
Commonwealth's attorney was such as to make the guilty
plea involuntary and the action of the court in refusing to
permit its withdrawal an abuse of discretion.57
The Court went on to say that the plea would be deemed invol-
untary if the defendant were misled at the time of its entry.
Since the record revealed that Couch and his attorney had been
fully informed that the trial judge would not be bound by the
prosecutor's recommendation, the Court held that there was no
abuse of discretion.
Couch is consistent with prior Kentucky cases. The Court
of Appeals has refused on a number of occasions to overturn a
conviction based on a guilty plea when the sentencing author-
ity failed to follow the prosecutor's recommendation.58 The
Court of Appeals has indicated, however, that its sense of fair-
ness was strained by at least two of these cases.59 In both of
5 The judge refused to permit the 2-year sentence, which the defendant was
presently serving, to be served concurrently with the sentence for robbery and house-
breaking. Id. at 2.
Id. at 7.
Wood v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1971) (The Court by way of
dictum stated that the judge was not bound to follow the recommendation of the
prosecution.); Ruggles v. Commonwealth, 335 S.W.2d 344 (Ky. 1960) (jury refused to
follow recommendation); Layne v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1951); Hobbs
v. Commonwealth, 214 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1948) (jury refused to follow the sentencing
recommendation of prosecution); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1947);
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 196 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1946).
11 In Hayes v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1947), the Court of Appeals
refused to overturn a sentence by a jury in excess of the recommendation of the
prosecution, but stated that the trial judge would have been "justified" in granting a
new trial to the defendant. In a similar case, Hobbs v. Commonwealth, 214 S.W.2d
274 (Ky. 1948), the Court said that the trial court "should" have granted a new trial.
In both instances, however, the Court of Appeals refused to grant a new trial.
19751
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those cases the Court characterized the result as a possible
"miscarriage of justice which might well be righted through
executive clemency.""0
This author agrees that a miscarriage of justice results
when a defendant is given a sentence that is harsher than the
one recommended by the Commonwealth's attorney.6' A de-
fendant who pleads guilty in return for a sentence recommen-
dation by the prosecution expects to receive that sentence. The
decision to plead will sometimes be based on a defense coun-
sel's advice that a particular judge "usually" accepts the prose-
cution's recommendation. If a judge suddenly reverses his pat-
tern and imposes a harsher sentence, the defendant is unfairly
treated.62
The federal courts have resolved this problem with Rule
11(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which per-
mits the government's attorney and the defendant to engage in
plea bargaining. If a bargain is reached it is disclosed to the
judge, who may either accept or reject the bargain. If the judge
rejects the agreement, however, the defendant is permitted to
withdraw his guilty plea.
This author would recommend Rule 11(e) to the Court of
Appeals as a just resolution of the unfairness in the Couch
situation. It provides independence and flexibility for the trial
judge, while insuring that the defendant is treated fairly. It will
guard against possible miscarriages of justice in situations
where a defendant is forced to bargain without knowing what
sentence he will receive.
10 Hayes v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1947); Hobbs v. Commonwealth,
214 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Ky. 1948) (citing Hayes).
11 One author has stated: "In the rare instance when the judge decides to su-
persede the prosecutor by imposing a harsher sentence than the prosectuor recom-
mended, the defendent will understandably feel victimized by factors beyond his con-
trol." Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 297 (1972).
12 The Kentucky Court has held that the failure of the prosecutor to abide by his
agreement will be grounds for reversal. Wood v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 765 (Ky.
1971); Mounts v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W. 311 (Ky. 1889). In Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a defendant, who had pleaded guilty
after the prosecutor had agreed to make no sentence recommendation, was entitled to
relief when a new prosecutor recommended to the sentencing judge that the defendant
be given the maximum sentence.
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